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Labour Mobility in Europe – 
An untapped resource?  
Despite the public perception in many member states that 
labour mobility has spiralled out of control, intra-EU migra-
tion remains low, particularly within the euro area. The limits 
to the potential of labour mobility became evident during 
the economic crisis as high unemployment rates in the pe-
riphery have only caused limited mobility from crisis coun-
tries. Hence, the bulk of labour mobility still flows from east 
to west but ten years after the eastern enlargement the 
number of East Europeans living in EU15 should be of no 
overall concern. In view of the lessons learned from the cri-
sis, the Commission and member states should improve ex-
isting tools for cross-border job matching and adopt a 
longer-term view on labour mobility.
Focus  
 
 
Due to the economic crisis, the previously 
popular immigration countries in the pe-
riphery experienced a major reversal of 
their migration balances. By 2013, net im-
migration rates by foreigners had declined 
sharply or even turned to net emigration 
while emigration rates among nationals in-
creased significantly. Absolute outflows re-
mained relatively low however. 
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1. Introduction 
The right of free movement of persons is a 
cornerstone of the European Union and, ac-
cording to a Eurobarometer survey, one of 
the most popular accomplishments of the 
EU. Since its establishment this right has 
been steadily built upon and expanded, in 
particular with respect to mobile EU work-
ers. Barriers to (labour) mobility have been 
substantially reduced as part of creating 
the single market and also as a means to 
achieve the EU2020 goals of smart and in-
clusive growth. And yet the prevailing view 
in academic circles and among policy-mak-
ers is that intra-EU labour mobility is too 
low; too low to support the single labour 
market as anything but a notion and too 
low to play anything other than a modest 
role in helping to rebalance the eurozone 
after the crisis. 
 
Labour mobility with the European Union 
is low compared with the US. Less than 3% 
of EU citizens currently reside in another 
EU country; only one-tenth of its transat-
lantic reference point. The same is true for 
annual mobility flows between states, 
which in the EU do not even amount to 
0.3% of its population – once more a tenth 
of the corresponding US statistic (Barslund 
and Busse 2014). 
 
Yet comparison with the US will most 
likely always leave Europe short because of 
language barriers, cultural differences, dis-
similarities in education systems and a lack 
of cross-border personal ties. Still, a more 
mobile European workforce would bring 
significant benefits and more could be done 
to support those willing to work abroad 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). 
 
Even though intra-EU labour mobility 
seems low, in recent years it has been a 
controversial issue. The public debate in  
some countries depicts a situation where 
too many people are moving in search of 
jobs and welfare, particularly since en-
largement and the end of restrictions on 
free movement for East Europeans. At the 
same time, there is a fear that the brightest 
and best are moving abroad for work, 
thereby damaging the long-term growth 
and development prospects of sending 
countries. 
 
 
2. Labour mobility and the 
economic crisis 
The main engine of intra-EU mobility dur-
ing the past decade has been the large in-
come gap between the old member states 
(EU15) and the new member states in the 
east (EU10) that joined the EU from 2004 
onwards. Most EU15 countries introduced 
temporary restrictions that partially di-
verted mobility flows away from traditional 
destinations, such as Germany, towards 
Ireland and the UK, which did not impose 
restrictions (Baas and Brücker 2012). For 
Bulgaria and Romania restrictions were in 
place until 2014 for all but a few EU15 
countries.  
 
Outflows from EU10 countries were indeed 
considerable. Poland and Latvia saw more 
than 0.5% of their domestic populations 
move to the EU15 each year in the period 
2004-08. Annual outflows from Lithuania 
reached 1% and almost 1.5% of the popula-
tion in Bulgaria (see Figure 1). EU10 citi-
zens had different preferences as destina-
tion countries; the most popular destina-
tions were Spain and Italy (mainly for Ro-
manians) while Poles largely sought oppor-
tunities in the UK and Germany.  
 
By comparison, mobility flows between 
EU15 member states were negligent. Only 
around 0.1% of EU15 citizens per year 
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moved to another EU country in 2009. In-
come differences between the EU15 – a key 
driver of labour mobility – were not large 
enough to entice large numbers of workers 
to move. At the same time, unemployment 
rates across EU15 countries were low and 
converged in the pre-crisis period, thus fur-
ther reducing incentives to seek employ-
ment abroad. 
 
The financial and subsequent debt crisis 
slowed down mobility flows from EU10 
countries, as unemployment rose in EU15 
countries. Since 2011, statistics indicate 
that east-west mobility flows have re-
bounded somewhat but rates have re-
mained lower than before the crisis (OECD 
2013). 
 
Significantly, the crisis triggered a redirec-
tion of mobility flows away from the periph-
ery (Spain in particular) towards Germany, 
the UK and other northern European coun-
tries. While net immigration rates fell in 
the peripheral countries they were slow to 
turn into net emigration. The expiry of tran-
sitory restrictions on free movement may 
have played a role in this change of desti-
nation. 
 
High unemployment rates in the 
periphery have only caused limited 
mobility  
Within the EU15, the crisis caused a major 
reversal in the apparent economic conver-
gence. The deteriorating labour market sit-
uation in southern Europe, in particular for 
young people, resulted in higher outflows 
of nationals of these countries. Absolute fig-
ures remained low, however. Five years 
into the crisis, the net emigration rates for 
Spanish and Italian nationals had only in-
creased slightly, to less than 0.1%. Nation-
als of Greece and Portugal are somewhat 
more mobile, with a net emigration of 
around 4 individuals for every 1,000 na-
tionals. Ireland has seen somewhat more 
mobility, probably due to ties to the UK and 
the language advantage (see frontpage). 
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Overall, wage differences seem to be a 
much more powerful driver of mobility 
than unemployment rates in the EU. This 
fact, and the evidence from young cohorts, 
suggests that we can expect only limited 
mobility within the EU15 even in the cur-
rent economic climate. Moreover, the lag in 
response observed during this deep crisis 
makes labour mobility ineffective as a 
means of burden-sharing within the mone-
tary union (Holland and Paluchowski 
2013). 
 
 
3. The long-term economic 
impact of mobility is uncer-
tain 
 
The mid- to long-term costs and benefits of 
labour mobility at member state level will 
depend on a range of factors, not least 
whether a country is at the sending or re-
ceiving end of mobility. In receiving coun-
tries, discussions have focused on concerns 
about the financial burden that mobile 
workers place on welfare states, in particu-
lar because access to social benefits by 
newcomers is sometimes considered to be 
too easy. Overall, the total stock of EU10 
citizens residing in EU15 countries should 
not cause much concern (see Figure 2). For 
most countries the share of EU10 citizens 
is below or around just 2%. Moreover, avail-
able research does not find welfare provi-
sion in the host country to be an important 
incentive to migrate. On the contrary, most 
EU-migrants move for work reasons, are 
more likely to be in employment, and do 
not make more extensive use of welfare 
provisions than nationals (European Com-
mission 2013). 
 
At the same time, sending countries fear 
that it is mainly the brightest and best who 
are leaving, eroding the human capital base 
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and thus long-term growth and develop-
ment prospects. In the case of EU15-pe-
riphery countries, the limited mobility 
flows and high unemployment rates, also 
for highly educated workers in these coun-
tries, mean that fears of a brain drain are 
currently not justified. However, for some 
EU10 countries a continuation of past 
trends, if combined with limited return mo-
bility, may impair economic development 
in the longer run (see Figure 3). This is but 
one area of mobility where better data 
would allow for an improved assessment of 
the impact of longer-run trends. 
 
While it is difficult to predict mobility pat-
terns, the overall potential for mobility is 
likely to decrease in the future, given the 
further convergence of income levels be-
tween east and west and the ageing of Eu-
rope’s workforce. This points to the need to 
consider measures to increase the attrac-
tiveness of the EU for foreign talent and to 
facilitate the mobility of third-country na-
tionals in order to foster growth and em-
ployment. 
 
 
4. No game changers: im-
prove existing tools... 
Overall, the recent recession has not in-
duced previously immobile workers to be-
come more mobile, at least not in the larger 
member states. This leads us to conclude 
that successfully fostering mobility within 
EU15 countries requires tremendous effort.  
In general, those willing to move should not 
be discouraged from doing so by unneces-
sary barriers to mobility. The European 
Commission would do well to continue the 
modernization of existing tools, in particu-
lar: 
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Upgrade of the EURES system   
Until recently, the EURES online portal has 
received little attention and only covered 
between 30% and 40% of all vacancies in 
the EU. The recently proposed re-design of 
the EURES system is a step in the right di-
rection, as are the proposals to facilitate 
better cooperation among public employ-
ment services and learning from best prac-
tices regarding mobility and cross-border 
recruitment. 
 
Recognition and portability of qualifi-
cations   
With the recent update of the Directive on 
the recognition of professional qualifica-
tions, the EU has facilitated the recognition 
procedures and introduced the European 
Professional Card. When transposing the 
directive, member states should aim to 
speed up and simplify administrative pro-
cedures. Moving forward with the Euro-
pean qualification framework, which is still 
not fully implemented, will further help in-
crease transparency. 
 
Learning from local and regional mo-
bility projects   
Much is to be learned from the efforts put 
into many regional projects in Germany 
and elsewhere aiming at recruitment from 
abroad, primarily from Spain and other 
southern European countries. These pro-
jects connect domestic SMEs that are una-
ble to fill vacancies with jobseekers from 
abroad. While the strength of these projects 
lies in a bottom-up approach, the EU should 
evaluate their success closely, facilitate 
learning from best practices and also con-
sider institutional support via the ESF. 
 
None of these measures will be game 
changers, however. That the Commission is 
aware of this is probably reflected in the 
meagre target for the number of young peo-
ple matched to jobs via ‘My first EURES 
Job’, which is 5,000 placements of young 
people. The initiative helps young people 
under 30 to find a job in another country by 
providing, among other things, financial 
support for the interview process. 
 
 
5. …and think about the 
long term 
Breaking down mobility barriers and sup-
porting mobile citizens will continue to be 
a dynamic process with no silver-bullet so-
lutions. Three issues merit further atten-
tion with regard to the longer term deeper 
integration of European labour markets 
and, equally important, to better under-
stand the impact of mobility. 
 
Improving foreign language compe-
tences   
Most EU member states have English as 
their first foreign language on the primary 
school curriculum. Yet, in terms of profi-
ciency there are huge differences between 
the best and the worst performers. While 
important in its own right, the renewed fo-
cus on mobility should give fresh impetus 
to push ahead with the ‘mother tongue + 
two foreign languages’ objective and the 
European Benchmark of Language Compe-
tences Initiative. 
 
Servicing mobile third-country nation-
als   
Obstacles to the mobility of third-country 
nationals abound, putting the EU at a dis-
advantage vis-à-vis international competi-
tion for new skills and talents. Neverthe-
less, member states show little appetite to 
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fully implement (optional) EU facilities for 
long-term residents, Blue Card holders, stu-
dents and researchers. The Commission 
should strive to improve existing directives 
and avoid watering down its proposal for 
students and researchers. 
 
The need for better data   
More and better information is always 
called for, but in the case of labour mobility 
it is warranted.  There is little evidence at 
the European level as to the importance of 
key factors, such as what constitutes the 
main barriers (particularly in the current 
economic situation), the role of return mi-
gration or skills acquired abroad. Some 
data sources are probably available in indi-
vidual member states. Others are hard to 
collect (e.g. longitudinal data on individu-
als). While no easy task, the Commission 
must think about how to improve upon 
this, not least to demonstrate the added 
value/mobility of European initiatives such 
as the ‘My first EURES job’ cited above. 
 
 
6. Do not expect too much 
The crisis has shown that there are clear 
limits to the potential of labour mobility 
within the current eurozone. This is mainly 
due to the limited mobility of nationals 
from the large countries hit by the crisis. At 
the same time, east-west mobility has not 
been fundamentally affected by the crisis. 
Even very adverse employment prospects 
in some countries have not induced more 
people to move, which indicates that we 
should not expect too much from any fur-
ther elimination of administrative barriers 
to mobility – at least not in the short term. 
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Policy Brief 2014/02: 20 years of the European single mar-
ket: growth effects of EU integration   
The ongoing European integration has increased the economic 
growth of participating economies. Calculating the cumulative 
gains in the real gross domestic product per capita between 
1992 and 2012, every economy under consideration realized in-
come gains from the European integration. Denmark and Ger-
many saw the greatest gains per resident. If the values from only 
1992 and 2012 are compared, every country except for Greece 
has been able to achieve a higher per capita income. 
Policy Brief 2015/03: Wage inequality in Germany – What 
role does global trade play?   
Wage inequality in Germany has increased significantly since the 
mid-1990s. The intensification of international trade relations is a 
frequently cited cause for this issue. However, an empirical study 
revealed that global trade can only directly explain around 15 
percent of the in-crease in wage inequality in Germany. Primar-
ily, the growing heterogeneity among companies in Germany 
plays a greater role – especially within industries. The decline in 
collective bargaining is the primary company-specific driver of 
wage inequality. Nevertheless, protectionist measures would not 
be effective for achieving greater wage equality. 
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